# Evolving Algorand Governance **URL:** \ **Category:** Governance Discussions\ **Tags:** defi\ **Created:** [May 3, 2022, 6:58pm UTC](https://forum.algorand.co/t/evolving-algorand-governance/6646 "2022-05-03T18:58:49Z")\ **Posts on this page:** 1\ **Showing post:** 10
**Author:** ![nollied](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/n/bcef8e/32.png) [@nollied](https://forum.algorand.co/u/nollied)\ **Post date:** [May 3, 2022, 9:38pm UTC](https://forum.algorand.co/t/evolving-algorand-governance/6646/10 "2022-05-03T21:38:01Z")
> [@shaih](#): > > - How do we identify accounts that participate in DeFi, and how many governance seats they should get? i would be weary of giving too much power to the rich. although any dampening of wealth opens exploits to sybil accounts. to combat this, identity/KYC systems can be employed, but with the sacrifice of permissionless-ness. it’s a delicate balance. > [@shaih](#): > > How to reconcile changing participation levels over time? For example, how much weight should be given to a vote that happens sometime in the middle of a governance period, vs. how much to use for calculating rewards at the end of the period. a measure of breadth and depth of governance contribution is important. if you only vote on one item with 10,000 algos soft-staked, you are probably less valuable as a governer than someone who voted on 50 items, yet only soft-staked 100 algos. this of course assumes their depth level is reasonable – ie. they were diligent. one way to measure this is to hold a peer-to-peer review of importance. the coordinape tool comes to mind, although it can be done in a plethora of ways. these reviews are notoriously hard to get right. beware. > [@shaih](#): > > Should we have just a single governance rewards pool that is distributed among all governors, or should each segment have its own rewards pool? (E.g., 50% of the rewards go to DeFi participants and the other 50% to passive Algo holders.) ah yes… allocation of resources for public goods. i’m an active member in the gitcoin DAO and this is a problem we have dedicated workstreams to solve (like for example, the [fraud detection and defense workstream](https://gov.gitcoin.co/t/s14-proposal-fdd-season-14-budget-request/) that i am a leader in). we are collectively building [the 2.0 version of gitcoin grants](https://gov.gitcoin.co/t/gitcoin-grants-2-0/9981) where we are adopting a more modular approach for funding allocation. the goal is to provide all of the tools and processes needed to conduct resource allocation (based on the consensus of the community) without sacrificing legitimacy. **i would love to facilitate a collaboration between algorand and our fraud detection and defense workstream within gitcoin for fraud resilient governance fund allocations. this could be amazing!** > [@shaih](#): > > Algo holders who commit to holding their Algos in their account for [three months], would get [one] governance seat for every Algo they commit. this is called 1 dollar 1 vote (1d1v) and means that the rich potentially have unfairly amplified voices over the poor majority. we use quadratic funding, although it’s ripe with exploits so it should be proceeded with caution. --- _[View the full topic](https://forum.algorand.co/t/evolving-algorand-governance/6646)._