Evolving Algorand Governance

It seems to me my message might not have been clear enough.

The only asset that I consider that should have the right to vote on the future of Algorand, is Algorand (i.e. ALGO) alone. No other assets. Allow me to try to elaborate again on why.

ALGO holders have a stake in Algorand, thus are inherently incentivized to do what is in the best, long-term interest of Algorand. Any other assets that come to Algorand, require only a minimal ALGO stake. Therefore, they lack such an inherent incentive. Hence, if they were given voting power, others would need to blindly trust them to do what is good for Algorand.

However, the only premise that should be required from the ALGO holders to have is that each other user will do what is in their own best interest (i.e. that they will not be self-destructive). This is the basic assumption of PoS that guarantees the security of our funds. Trusting in nothing else should be required from us, regardless of how good we think non-ALGO assets might be for the ecosystem.

Further, the idea of 1 ALGO = 1 vote, was also already decided at the initial network-wide referendum on the governance program. In the details of that referendum “Decentralizing Algorand Governance”, accessible e.g. here, on page 4:

That referendum passed with more than 90% of online stake.

If that were not enough already, M1 is suggesting the assets to be given voting power to be completely liquid, further minimizing the required commitment towards Algorand.