The Algorand Foundation held a public xGov meeting on April 4, 2024 for the new version of xGov. Main Discussion Points: A. Becoming an xGov Member Operate an Algorand node to participate in the consensus (no minimum Algo stake is required) Complete the registration process to become an xGov memb…

Okay thank you! So I should just automatically receive the funds as long as I’ve been voting…thanks for the response, my apologies for the delayed response!

I’m just running a node on my own hardware but using the gALGO Vault…next quarter I’m not really sure what I’ll do, if I run a node, I don’t have 30k staked so I won’t receive rewards, but I like the convenience of being able to leverage the $ALGO for both consensus and liquidity in DeFi. I’m also n…

yeah, my biggest concern with delegation , well in particular with allowing liquid staking providers to also participate in xgov. There is supposedly some mechanics to prevent single entity for passing stuff, but imo it still elaves a lot of angles for exploit. I wonder how we’ll progress on that fr…

[image] StephaneBarroso: D. Refining the Voting Mechanism Adjustments to the voting and rewards mechanism are proposed to mitigate potential manipulation. These will be structured with thresholds and durations tailored to the amount of funding requested: Category Requested Amount (ALGO) Dis…

@GhostOfMcAfee we are in the design phase of the framework, basically the idea would be the following: a proposal is approved if ALL these conditions are met: A quorum of all xGov Voting Committee is reached, counting 1 Address 1 vote, independently from the actual preference (Yes or No): 10% of …

With respect to the quorum, what is the gatekeeping mechanism to ensure there is not a sybil attack designed to prevent passage? I understand that the weighted quorum in terms of total votes helps prevent sybil attack designed to pass suspect proposals (since you still must have the Algo stake neede…

Let me stress that the first two requirements, the quorums, are necessary but not sufficient: the real vote is by stake, that is a proposal passes if it receives the majority of the votes (50% +1 of the voters by stake) of xGovs which actually participate. So a sybil attack won’t have an effect on t…

Right. But my question was about using a Sybil attack to prevent proposals from passing. Couldn’t I spin up a huge botnet to ensure proposals never get the requisite relevancy? If so, what’s the mechanism that makes that less likely.

The huge botnet cannot prevent proposals, because the quorums are measured on the number of xGovs voting on that particular proposal, independently from the actual Yes or No. What a huge botnet could do is “fake” attention, that is let an “irrelevant” proposal pass one of the quorum, but then, in or…

[image] trekianov: because the quorums are measured on the number of xGovs voting on that particular proposal, independently from the actual Yes or No What if I make a massive botnet that always votes, but always votes “no”?

[xGov][Community meeting][New Version][2024/04/04]

Governance Discussions

Adri May 30, 2024, 8:47am 58

It’s okay to have less xGovs. We must strive to find the balance between quality and quantity.

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[xGov][Community meeting][New Version][2024/04/04]

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