The existing general governance voting framework, while robust, requires careful adaptation to facilitate the election of the xGov council. This new task in fact presents a distinct challenge: the selection of 11 counselors from an initial pool of 22 candidates. Unlike previous voting instances where the success of individual measures was independent of others, this process necessitates a reliable mechanism to accurately “sort” the candidate list based on the collective preferences of the entire community. This adaptation will be crucial to ensure the legitimacy and effectiveness of the xGov council, reflecting the true will of the decentralized governance participants.
We are therefore introducing a new vote counting mechanism designed to provide a more nuanced and representative outcome. Governors now have three ways to express their preference for each candidate:
Yes: This option signifies a positive endorsement of a candidate.
No: This option explicitly indicates that a governor does not want a particular candidate to be elected.
Abstain: This option allows a governor to express no strong preference for or against a candidate, likely due to the lack of knowledge about the candidate.
The Power of Explicit Rejection
The inclusion of an explicit “No” option is a significant improvement over traditional approval-only voting systems. Here’s why we think it’s better:
Discourages “Least Bad” Choices: In systems where only approval is possible, voters might approve candidates they don’t fully support simply because they are perceived as the “least bad” option among undesirable choices. Explicit rejection allows voters to actively voice their opposition to candidates perceived unsuitable, preventing them from gaining seats through a lack of strong alternatives.
Highlights Strong Opposition: A high number of No votes for a candidate clearly signals a significant portion of the electorate’s disapproval, even if that candidate also receives some approval votes. This provides a more accurate picture of a candidate’s overall sentiment among the governors.
Promotes More Representative Outcomes: By factoring in negative preferences, the new mechanism helps to filter out candidates who might have moderate approval but also significant opposition. This leads to a council composed of individuals who not only have a base of support but also do not face strong disapproval from a large segment of the electorate.
Reduces Strategic Voting: When voters can only approve, they might engage in strategic voting, approving candidates they don’t truly endorse to prevent a less preferred candidate from winning. The reject option can reduce the need for such strategic maneuvers, encouraging more honest and direct expression of preferences.
How the Winners are Determined
The winning list of candidates is determined by a simple calculation:
For each candidate, the total number of No votes is subtracted from the total number of Yes votes.
Candidates are then sorted in descending order based on this calculated score (Yes Votes - No Votes).
The first 11 candidates on this sorted list will constitute the first xGov council.
This new voting mechanism, particularly the introduction of explicit rejection, aims to create a more robust and truly representative xGov council, ensuring that the elected governors reflect a broader and more accurate sentiment of the community.
Reserve List
The elected xGov council is expected to be in operation for a year. Furthermore, the two non-elected candidates with the highest scores will form a reserve list for the first year, ready to step in should any elected council members be unable to fulfill their duties, thus ensuring continuity and stability for the xGov council if needed.
What’s being done to ensure the 454 million (and growing) algo in Reti pools can vote?
Reti has been live since January and was in development far beyond that (with information about its contracts given to governance members). Is governance going to use a snapshot to allow reti pools to vote (or bare minimum, the validator owners) ?
I believe that the best practice for this governance vote is to cast a Yes vote for candidates one strongly supports, Abstain for candidates one does not know well, and No for candidates one strongly wishes to reject. For example, those who vote in this way can be considered “conscientious voters.”
However, given that this vote requires a substantial amount of information to be reviewed, it is likely that some participants will cast their votes without fully reading or understanding the rules. In such cases, voters may fall into two types: “aggressive voters,” who vote Yes for their preferred candidates and No for all others, and “kind-hearted voters,” who vote Yes for their preferred candidates and Abstain for all others.
When aggressive voters are present, the votes of conscientious voters and kind-hearted voters become relatively less effective. As a result, even conscientious voters who wish to use their votes effectively may feel compelled to vote aggressively.
Is it truly appropriate for a system to be structured in such a way that the voices of voters who sincerely choose to Abstain are less likely to be reflected?
I think the choice of 3-option range voting system (Yes/Abstain/No) is an excellent and practical approach.
From what I’ve observed in various elections, voters often have strong positive or negative feelings about specific candidates while remaining indifferent to others. This voting system is perfect for capturing precisely these essential sentiments without introducing any additional complexity. A voting mechanism that is just expressive enough for voters’ strongest preferences often leads to more accurate results, as it can reduce confused voting behavior and the temptation for tactical voting.
Also, as mentioned by @trekianov, this system is essentially an extension of approval voting, which is known for its resilience against strategic manipulation compared to most other voting methods. It’s hard to imagine that all the beneficial properties of approval voting would be lost in range voting, as the core principle of expressing clear approval or disapproval remains the same.
I also want to acknowledge the very thoughtful counterarguments from @aper_nft about the potential for aggressive tactical voting. It’s a valid concern, but I’m not entirely convinced it would be a dominant strategy. For instance, if a voter who plans to cast one “Yes” and one “No” (and abstain on the rest) considers switching to a more aggressive strategy of one “Yes” and “No” for all others, it’s not a clear-cut advantage. While this tactic would slightly increase their preferred candidate’s chances, it could also inadvertently help a candidate they dislike win by lowering the scores of all other contenders. Therefore, I don’t believe it’s an automatic winning strategy to vote aggressively just because others might be.
That said, I do see the scenario where a voter with only one preferred candidate might tactically vote “No” on all others. I think this is a perfectly acceptable and understandable behavior, as long as it’s a widely understood aspect of the system. It simply reflects a strong preference for a single candidate above all others.
Overall, I’m very optimistic about this voting mechanism and think this is a very promising direction!
P.S. This response was drafted with the help of AI, based on the points I wanted to make.